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INTRODUCTION
Originalism1 is not a monolith. I take it here to refer to a theory of
statutory interpretation that requires adherence to the statute’s original public
meaning—what people at the time would have understood it to mean.2 One
purpose of this method of interpretation is the preservation of democratic
* J.D. Candidate, Harvard Law School, 2016; Ph.D., Philosophy, University of Colo-
rado Boulder, 2013; Graduate Certificate, Women and Gender Studies, University of Col-
orado Boulder, 2013; B.A., Philosophy, Washburn University, 2008. I would like to
thank Dean Martha Minow and Professor Mark Tushnet for their helpful comments. I
would also like to thank the Harvard Journal of Law & Gender for their work providing
both excellent substantive suggestions and editorial prowess. Finally, I thank Alison Jag-
gar, who helped me in my earlier dissertation work to develop some of the ideas that are
found in this Note.
1 Though I refer to the view outlined by this name throughout, it is sometimes called
textualism. See generally, e.g., John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from
Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70 (2006) (referring to the theory of originalism that I
address in this Note as “textualism”). I have picked this term to provide consistency
throughout, despite the different terms used in the literature to which I cite.
2 See, e.g., Ingrid Wuerth, An Originalism for Foreign Affairs?, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
5, 8 (2008) (“‘Originalism,’ as used here, means the interpretation of the Constitution in
accordance with the original public meaning of the text, unless that meaning cannot be
determined with sufficient confidence.”); Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Originalism as
a Legal Enterprise, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 47, 48 (2006); Manning, supra note 1, at 77; R
Antonin Scalia, Originalism: the Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 851–52 (1989)
(discussing the method of interpretation used in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52
(1926)) [hereinafter Scalia, Lesser].
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impulses; failing to interpret the text of a law as it was understood by those
who adopted it is to impose judicial will, to override the result of the politi-
cal process on the whim of one or a few individuals.3 As a result, for
originalists, determining this original meaning, or a semantically permissible
range of meaning, is the primary task of statutory interpretation.4 In the con-
text of constitutional interpretation, in particular, originalists face a cluster of
criticisms that might best be summed up as the charge that the original
meaning of the Constitution is exclusionary in some way.5 One example of
this sort of criticism that has received especially fervent attention is the
charge that originalism is incapable of accommodating the result in Brown v.
Board of Education.6 The drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment would
never have understood it to require desegregation,7 the argument goes, yet
desegregation was clearly the required outcome in the case, so originalism
must be defective, and gravely so.8
3 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 671–77
(1990) (reconstructing the argument in this way: “In a representative democracy . . .
major policy decisions should be made by the popularly elected branches of government,
mainly Congress. Unelected judges should make as few policy choices as possible, espe-
cially when interpreting statutes.”). Compare Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a
Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitu-
tion and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3,
17–18 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) [hereinafter Scalia, Common-Law] (“[U]nder the
guise or even the self-delusion of pursuing unexpressed legislative intents, common-law
judges will in fact pursue their own objectives and desires, extending their lawmaking
proclivities from the common law to the statutory field.”) with Scalia, Lesser, supra note
2, at 862 (“[O]riginalism seems to me more compatible with the nature and purpose of a R
Constitution in a democratic system. A democratic society does not, by and large, need
constitutional guarantees to insure that its laws will reflect ‘current values.’ Elections take
care of that quite well. The purpose of constitutional guarantees . . . is precisely to pre-
vent the law from reflecting certain changes in original values that the society adopting
the Constitution thinks fundamentally undesirable. Or, more precisely, to require the soci-
ety to devote to the subject the long and hard consideration required for a constitutional
amendment before those particular values can be cast aside.”) (emphasis omitted).
4 See, e.g., Scalia, Common-Law, supra note 3, at 22–24 (“Words do have a limited R
range of meaning, and no interpretation that goes beyond that range is permissible.”).
5 Here, I have in mind criticisms that the drafters, or the ordinary politically active
person at the time, would not have included, e.g., women or racial minorities in their
contemplation of the rights they laid down in text. Also relevant are criticisms that they
would not have included specific activities, like desegregation of schools or pay
discrimination.
6 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (requiring the desegregation of schools under the Fourteenth
Amendment).
7 See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 75–76 (1990); Michael
Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213,
252 (1991); Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretiv-
ism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 800 (1983). But see, e.g., CHARLES A.
LOFGREN, THE PLESSY CASE 65 (1987); MICHAEL PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE
COURTS 145–46 (1994); John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities
Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385, 1462–63 (1992); Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and
the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947, 953 (1995).
8 See MARK A. GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL
15 (2006) (“Contemporary constitutional theory rests on three premises: Brown v. Board
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This Note does not take a stance on the lively debate over this question.
Rather, I wish to suggest here that there is a more potent version of the
criticism that originalism is exclusionary and ultimately undemocratic.
Meaning is not given; it is made. In particular, language takes on meaning
only in the context of a society,9 it changes over time, and it reflects the
social structures in society, for good or ill. In a society marked by hierar-
chy—race-based, gender-based, class-based, and otherwise—language, too,
is marked by hierarchy.10 One way in which this manifests itself is through
hermeneutical injustices: gaps in collective conceptual resources where so-
cial experiences go unnamed.11 Think, for example, of the gap in collective
understanding of sexual harassment prior to the creation of the concept.12
So much of the debate over originalism and its merits has focused on
determining the meaning of the text, that commentators have overlooked the
potential problems with that meaning in itself, whatever it turns out to be.
Suppose, for the sake of argument, that we can determine the original mean-
ing of some bit of text. Our language at any given time provides a snapshot,
not merely of what is meant by some string of words, but of who is in
power, who is left out, and what is thought to be important. Uncovering the
meaning of a statute written in a language that is itself undemocratic, then, is
no help to originalists if they take seriously their own commitment to de-
mocracy. To put this another way, the semantic context of the words that end
up in statutes and constitutions is not politically neutral, so a theory like
originalism that relies on semantic context for interpretation will not be po-
litically neutral either. This Note presents a problem for originalism’s seman-
tic theory as applied to its political theory instead of the other way round.
of Education was correct, Lochner v. New York was wrong, and Dred Scott v. Sandford
was wrong.”).
9 See Manning, supra note 1, at 79 (“[Textualists] assert that language is intelligible R
only by virtue of a community’s shared conventions for understanding words in con-
text.”); see also Scalia, Common-Law, supra note 3, at 37 (“In textual interpretation, R
context is everything, and the context of the Constitution tells us not to expect nit-picking
detail, and to give words and phrases an expansive rather than narrow interpretation—
though not an interpretation that language will not bear.”).
10 See, e.g., Jennifer Hornsby, Feminism in Philosophy of Language, in THE CAM-
BRIDGE COMPANION TO FEMINISM IN PHILOSOPHY 78, 78 (Miranda Fricker & Jennifer
Hornsby eds., 2000); see also Alison M. Jaggar, Feminism in Ethics: Moral Justification,
in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO FEMINISM IN PHILOSOPHY, supra, at 225, 238
(“Speaking requires a language but dominant vocabularies may lack the resources neces-
sary to express the perspectives of subordinated groups.”).
11 MIRANDA FRICKER, EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE 151 (2007); see also, e.g., IRIS MARIAN
YOUNG, INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY 55 (2000) (“Having obtained a presence in the
public, citizens sometimes find that those still more powerful in the process exercise,
often unconsciously, a new form of exclusion: others ignore or dismiss or patronize their
statements and expressions. Though formally included in a forum or process, people may
find that their claims are not taken seriously . . . . I call these familiar experiences internal
exclusion, because they concern ways that people lack effective opportunity to influence
the thinking of others even when they have access to fora and procedures of decision-
making.”).
12 FRICKER, supra note 11, at 150. R
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I argue here that the existence of hermeneutical injustice as a pervasive
feature of our collective linguistic and conceptual resources undermines the
originalist task at two levels: one procedural, one substantive. First, large
portions of society were (and continue to be) systematically excluded from
the process of meaning creation when the Constitution and its Amendments
were adopted, so originalism relies on enforcement of a meaning that was
generated through an undemocratic process. Second, the original meaning of
some13 words in those texts may be substantively objectionable as a result
because they fail to capture the relevant experiences of affected people at the
time even if they accurately capture the conceptual understanding of reason-
able people at the time, and this substantive failing may infect the text’s
democratic legitimacy. To the extent that it can be overcome, overcoming
this epistemic problem will require originalists to take seriously the insights
of critical theory, understood in this Note as a normative inquiry into the
historical context of the language and meaning of statutory text.14 Because
originalists are already committed to a nominally descriptive inquiry into
this context, and because this nominally descriptive inquiry masks the inher-
ently normative aspects of the hermeneutical landscape, the switch to an
explicitly normative inquiry may prove quite painless.15
13 I want to remain agnostic in this Note about whether the problems I present might
reach all the concepts employed in the Constitution (or any other law). It is possible that
they do, but that is a broad, strong claim that would require further defense. For the
purposes of this piece, I just suppose that at least some of the concepts employed require
some critical analysis to avoid causing problems. As a rough first pass, we can expect the
problems I describe here to arise primarily in cases where concepts have some normative
content already built into them. For example, “Person” carries a sort of normative bag-
gage that “Age of thirty five Years,” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5, does not.
14 See, e.g., IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 5 (2011
ed. 2011) (“[C]ritical theory is a normative reflection that is historically and socially
contextualized. Critical theory rejects as illusory the effort to construct a universal nor-
mative system insulated from a particular society. Normative reflection must begin from
historically specific circumstances because there is nothing but what is, the given, the
situated interest in justice, from which to start. . . . Social description and explanation
must be critical, that is, aim to evaluate the given in normative terms. Without such a
critical stance, many questions about what occurs in a society and why, who benefits and
who is harmed, will not be asked, and social theory is liable to reaffirm and reify the
given social reality.”).
15 At least, theoretically painless. Practically, one imagines such a switch would be
difficult given the existing but contingent political valences of originalism on the one
hand and various sorts of critical theory on the other. Compare Margaret H. Lemos, The
Politics of Statutory Interpretation, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849, 853 (2013) (arguing
that textualism has been historically associated with political conservatism) with Mark
Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: A Political History, 100 YALE L.J. 1515, 1516 (1991)
(suggesting that “critical legal studies is a political location for a group of people on the
Left who share the project of supporting and extending the domain of the Left in the legal
academy”).
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I. TWO TENETS OF ORIGINALISM
Law is so much about what words mean, whether the words of a con-
tract, a statute, a policy document, or a protection order. In each case, the
meaning of those words is important because they will bind, enable, con-
strain, punish, or shield the people to whom they apply, and different inter-
pretations will benefit and burden different parties. In the following Parts, I
argue that originalism about statutory and constitutional interpretation is
driven by two connected intuitions about using words to bind actions: people
should be bound only by those words as collectively understood at the time
of enactment, and words do not have meanings beyond how they are used in
particular social contexts. I briefly discuss each of these tenets of originalism
in turn.
A. Text as Democratic Expression
If you ask me if I want anything from Starbucks, and I ask you to get
me a tall soy latte, what I mean is that I want a tall soy latte. If you come
back with a grande soy latte, or a tall cow’s milk latte, or a tall soy mocha,
then there is a problem because none of those things is what I requested. If
we draft a contract together whereby you agree to bring me a tall soy latte
every day in exchange for a fee, but you bring me one of the other things,
then you have breached the contract precisely because none of those things
is what I requested. We want others to understand what we mean when we
express ideas, and when people subvert our clear meaning, it is upsetting.
The originalist invites us to extend this logic to the democratic legisla-
tive process.16 That is, laws are drafted in order to accomplish certain goals.
In an attempt to realize these goals, legislators use some words and phrases
instead of others. If a legislature wants to regulate air quality, they will write
a statute that discusses air quality, not food safety or immigration restric-
tions. Even if a law is drafted carelessly, the fact that it was passed demo-
cratically provides all the reason needed to enforce it as written, just as there
is reason to bring me a tall soy latte even if you think I misspoke and would
prefer a grande.
If legislatures (or the drafters of the Constitution) speak clearly, then
judicial failure to enforce the clear meaning of the text amounts to subver-
sion of the autonomy of the drafters. In this case, however, the will and
sense of autonomy at stake is the will of the people as a whole (who theoreti-
cally authorize the drafters to make law), which makes the subversion one of
democracy and all the more grave. A judge or group of judges has no author-
16 See infra Part II for a discussion of how the Constitution and many statutes were
created through a process which was, in fact, not democratically representative, and how
this lack of representativeness may call into question the legitimate basis for the original-
ist interpretive theory.
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ity to interpret laws in a way inconsistent with the public meaning. Ex-
pounding this point, Justice Scalia writes:
[I]t is simply incompatible with democratic government, or in-
deed, even with fair government, to have the meaning of a law
determined by what the lawgiver meant, rather than by what the
lawgiver promulgated. . . . It is the law that governs, not the intent
of the lawgiver. That seems to me the essence of the famous
American ideal set forth in the Massachusetts constitution: A gov-
ernment of laws, not of men. Men may intend what they will; but
it is only the laws that they enact which bind us.17
Judge Bork, on the same point, writes that “the elected legislator or
executive may act where not forbidden; his delegation of power from the
people through an election is his authority. But the judge may act only where
authorized[;] . . . his commission is to apply the law.”18 As Professor Man-
ning has noted, then, the originalist holds fast to the text precisely because it
alone “has survived the constitutionally prescribed process of bicameralism
and presentment.”19
B. The Social Contingency of Meaning
A second tenet of originalism, which is in some ways a recent develop-
ment or expression of the view, is that the meaning of words and phrases is
socially contingent.20 That is, meaning is not given or eternal. It changes
over time based on the context.21 As Justice Scalia writes, “the meaning of a
word cannot be determined in isolation, but must be drawn from the context
in which it is used.”22 Though this fact is obvious enough, it is made explicit
in an originalist interpretive theory because it helps to explain why and how
words acquire meaning in the first place, and how they might mean different
things at different times or to different speakers and groups. “[L]anguage is
intelligible only by virtue of a community’s shared conventions for under-
17 Scalia, Common-Law, supra note 3, at 17 (emphasis omitted). R
18 BORK, supra note 7, at 150. See also GREGORY BASSHAM, ORIGINAL INTENT AND R
THE CONSTITUTION: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY 92–94 (1992) (noting that the appeal of
originalism comes from notions of delegation and legitimate separation of power rather
than majority rule).
19 Manning, supra note 1, at 73; accord Jonathan Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textual- R
ism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 27 (2006).
20 This growing recognition begins with Justice Scalia’s “new textualism” and is re-
fined by Manning’s expressions of textualism. Eskridge, supra note 3 at 623; Manning, R
supra note 1, at 73–75. See generally Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism 30 (Ill. R
Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 07-24, 2008)
[hereinafter Solum, Semantic], archived at http://perma.cc/T58E-WRXB (arguing for the
importance of the fixation thesis—the thesis that the semantic content of a law is fixed at
the time it is passed—to all originalist theories whether for semantic or policy reasons).
21 See, e.g., Manning, supra note 1, at 75 (“the meaning of statutory language (like R
all language) depends wholly on context”).
22 Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 132 (1993).
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standing words in context.”23 Manning gives voice to this point with charac-
teristic lucidity:
Because the meaning of language depends on the way a linguistic
community uses words and phrases in context, textualists recog-
nize that meaning can never be found exclusively within the en-
acted text. This feature of textualism, moreover, goes well beyond
the often subconscious process of reading words in context in or-
der to pinpoint the “ordinary” meaning of a word that may mean
several things in common parlance.24
Manning goes on to note the importance of various cues in interpreting
language, from the use of terms of art, to traditional canons of construction,
to the role of purpose in shaping linguistic choices.25 While a purposivist will
use these tools as well, she will also turn to the policy context—“the overall
tenor of the statute, patterns of policy judgments made in related legislation,
the ‘evil’ that inspired Congress to act, or express statements found in the
legislative history”26—of a law for guidance in its interpretation. Ultimately,
Manning argues convincingly that what separates originalists from
purposivists is which context they consider most relevant: the semantic con-
text, rather than the policy context.27
The particular semantic contextual cues matter precisely because mean-
ing is not static and getting the meaning correct matters. Later, in Part III.A,
I take this analysis a bit further to argue that any semantic context carries
with it the marks of oppression and inequality within a society.
II. AN OLD PROBLEM FOR ORIGINALISM: SOCIAL EXCLUSION
Perhaps the most ready, well-worn objection to originalism is that it has
necessarily failed to keep pace with a society that has progressed beyond
various forms of inequality and exclusion.28 It demands the enforcement of
meanings that we would consider unacceptable today. Cass Sunstein put the
problem this way:
23 Manning, supra note 1, at 79. R
24 Id. at 78.
25 Id. at 81–85.
26 Id. at 71.
27 Id. at 110.
28 An objection, it should be noted, which is not unique to originalism. “The Ameri-
can experience with slavery demonstrates how, in the wrong hands or in the wrong cir-
cumstances, all constitutional theories yield unjust conclusions. [Chief Justice] Taney
[writing the majority decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 419 (1856),] could
employ numerous constitutional modalities to promote proslavery and racist policies be-
cause all forms of constitutional logic are capable of yielding evil results.” GRABER,
supra note 8, at 83. R
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Hard originalism29 is an unacceptable project because it is incon-
sistent with too much that is both settled and worthy in many ar-
eas, including free speech, religious liberty, racial discrimination,
and sex discrimination. The problem with hard originalism—put-
ting the epistemological problems to one side—is not that it is
indeterminate, but that it would result in an unacceptably narrow
set of liberties for the United States in the Twentieth Century.30
It is an unfortunate fact of history that the laws we have—particularly,
but not exclusively, the older they are—were written by, and to serve, cer-
tain groups of people and not others. The Constitution was written at a time
when slavery was part of the basic economic structure of the country, by
many people who themselves held slaves, and it explicitly preserved the in-
stitution of slavery.31 Similarly, women, poor white men, and other whole
classes of people were not included in the ratification process or contem-
plated directly by the document that resulted.32 Yet today we purport to have
advanced, and among these advancements are the inclusion of racial minori-
ties, women, and the poor in the ambit of public life. Of course, the Consti-
tution has been amended several times since the founding of the country, and
several of these amendments are corrective of original exclusions. Yet the
same problems remain, though in a different way. In a country that ostensi-
bly progresses gradually toward greater inclusion and recognition of rights,
old laws will reflect old consensus and fail to be inclusive.
This is a problem for originalism, but not (or not only) because it leads
to unacceptable conclusions about current cases. This apparent problem can
be dealt with somewhat glibly by the originalist, who may just point to the
democratic process. If it is true that a law passed in the past no longer re-
flects the will of the people in the present, then those people can change the
law, even amend the Constitution, or pass a new law that does. Until that
happens, the only thing a judge is authorized to do is enforce the law as
written.33 It is not uncommon to see courts do just this: enforce an unsavory
interpretation, note that they find it unsavory, and suggest that the legislature
29 Sunstein distinguishes between hard and soft originalism. Hard originalists “are
trying to do something like go back in a time machine and ask the Framers very specific
questions about how we ought to resolve very particular problems.” Cass Sunstein, Five
Theses on Originalism, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 311, 312 (1996). Of course, so put,
this view is distinct from the kind of sophisticated original public meaning theory that I
discuss here.
30 Id.
31 See Jamal Greene, Originalism’s Race Problem, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 517, 518–19
(2011).
32 See, e.g., id. at 518. See generally AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION:
A BIOGRAPHY (2005) (providing a history of the Constitution); PAULINE MAIER, RATIFI-
CATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 1787-1788 (2011) (providing a history
of State ratifications of the Constitution).
33 See, e.g., BORK, supra note 7, at 147. R
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take action.34 Rather, social exclusion is a problem for originalism most
pressingly because it undermines the chief benefit of being tied to the origi-
nal meaning of the text, which is that it was that text, with that meaning—
and no other—that was passed democratically. If the text came to govern
without the consent of a large portion of the people it purported to govern at
the time and into the future, then its democratic appeal is lost. The objection
is sometimes framed as a “dead hand” problem.35
Originalists may respond to this sort of criticism by denying that the
original understanding is at odds with the current views or by biting the
bullet and suggesting that a legislative change or constitutional amendment
is required. Steven Calabresi, for example, responds to concerns about ac-
commodating anti-discrimination laws in an originalist constitutional theory
by denying that Congress has the power to pass discriminatory laws with
respect to race or gender (but does with respect to sexual orientation, an
outcome that may cause more discomfort today than in 2007) in the first
place because they are not “necessary and proper” and constitute “Adjudi-
cation” rather than “Legislation,” and by offering an alternative history of
the Fourteenth Amendment on which decisions like Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation36 and Loving v. Virginia37 could have been correctly decided on
originalist grounds.38 Similarly, Judge Bork notes that, because the Constitu-
tion sets a floor on rights, we, the people of the present, are free to expand
rights:
The question is really meant to indicate that courts should be free
to write into the Constitution freedoms from democratic control
that the Framers omitted. Yet that is the one proposition that the
objection to rule by the dead, if it had any validity, does not sup-
port. The dead, and unrepresentative, men who enacted our Bill of
Rights and the Civil War amendments did not thereby forbid us,
the living, to add new freedoms. We remain entirely free to create
all the additional freedoms we want by constitutional amendment
or by simple legislation, and the nation has done so frequently.
34 See, e.g., Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., 550 U.S. 618, 661 (2007)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Commonwealth v. Robertson, 5 N.E.3d 522, 529 n.17 (Mass.
2014) (reversing a criminal conviction for taking “upskirt” photos under a “Peeping
Tom” statute, but noting that other states had criminalized such photos explicitly).
35 See, e.g., Greene, supra note 31, at 518. Compare Reva B. Siegel, Heller & R
Originalism’s Dead Hand—In Theory and Practice, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1399, 1423–24
(2009) (arguing that the problem is merely a theoretical one) with Frank Easterbrook,
Textualism and the Dead Hand, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1119, 1123 (1998) (arguing
against the objection).
36 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
37 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
38 Steven G. Calabresi, A Critical Introduction to the Originalism Debate, in
ORIGINALISM: A QUARTER-CENTURY OF DEBATE 1, 32–36 (Steven G. Calabresi ed.,
2007).
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What the questioner is really driving at is why judges, not the
electorate but judges, should be bound to protect against demo-
cratic choice only those liberties actually mentioned in the Consti-
tution. The real objection is not to rule by dead men who were not
fully representative of their society but to rule by living
majorities.39
Originalists of the public meaning variety, which is the view I intend to
challenge here, may also point out that even if people were systematically
and tragically excluded from the democratic process when a particular stat-
ute or constitutional provision/amendment was passed, what matters is how
the language would have been understood publicly at the time, which may
allow historical arguments for the true meaning of the language.
III. A NEW PROBLEM FOR ORIGINALISM: HERMENEUTICAL EXCLUSION
The old version(s) of the exclusion objection to originalism are compel-
ling for many people, but not if those people are originalists.40 If one finds
originalism attractive as a theory, there are certainly answers to the objection
as presented, and it is not unreasonable for a person to decide that the advan-
tages of the theory make up for its problems. In this Part, I aim to tighten the
vice on the originalist and make acceptance of the view in the face of the
exclusion objection more painful. To do this, the objection needs to shift
focus to the relationship between language and social power instead of the
impact of exclusion on particular laws. The objection presented here, as a
result, presents a deeper problem for originalism in that it calls its demo-
cratic legitimacy into question even in cases where a particular enactment is
not obviously problematic. In short, the hermeneutical exclusion objection
charges that language and its meaning are undemocratic in a society marked
by inequality, and that, as a result, interpreting a law in accord with its com-
mon meaning at the time of enactment risks enforcing that undemocratic
meaning on people who should not be bound by it.
A. Hermeneutical Injustice and the Structure of Language
Hermeneutical injustice is an intimidating name for a simple concept.
Fricker defines a hermeneutical injustice as “a lacuna where the name of a
distinctive social experience should be.”41 In other words, it is a deficiency
in our collective conceptual resources, reflected through language, where
present ways of thinking and talking are inadequate to describe reality. This
sort of gap is particularly problematic where the social experience in ques-
39 BORK, supra note 7, at 171. R
40 See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 38, at 32–33. R
41 FRICKER, supra note 11, at 150–51. R
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tion is oppressive or unfair because the inability to explain what the experi-
ence is or why it is bad can delay remedial action.42 Because language is
ever-present in human life, it is easy to see it as natural, given, and complete,
but this is manifestly not so.43 Language is made by and through social inter-
action. It does not neatly map onto social experience. As discussed earlier in
Part I.B, originalists are well-equipped to understand this insight. The same
intuition that gives force to the originalist focus on the meaning of words as
understood at the time they were enacted—the intuition that meaning is so-
cially contingent—lends plausibility to the idea of hermeneutical injustice. If
meaning is socially contingent, it is because meaning depends on and re-
flects particular social contexts, and if these social contexts are unjust, une-
qual, undemocratic, then language will reflect this. This is simply a part of
the semantic context of a text. If originalism is supposed to reflect common
sense methods of interpreting language,44 then it must consider this feature
of linguistic evolution.
Hermeneutical injustices often result from a collective inability to rec-
ognize and take seriously the experiences of members of oppressed groups.
Hermeneutical injustices of this sort result from obstacles and
limitations in the social imaginary that produce the inability to see
and hear certain things, forms of insensitivity that limit the com-
municative and epistemic capacities of members of certain groups
and preclude a genuine understanding of their experiences,
problems, and situations.45
Because members of oppressed groups are also members of the broader
social context in which language develops, they are likewise hampered in
their ability to give voice to their experiences. I mentioned the example of
the concept of sexual harassment earlier. Women (and other marginalized
people in the workplace) experienced sexual harassment long before we
were collectively able to give a name to the experience and thus able to
42 See infra text accompanying notes 43–44.
43 See, e.g., Sally Haslanger & Jennifer Saul, Philosophical Analysis and Social
Kinds: What Good Are Our Intuitions?, 80 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y, SUPPLEMENTARY
VOLUMES 89, 114 (2006) (“[O]ften what we take to be analytic principles actually en-
code certain social arrangements, and the relationship between terms encode certain
power structures.”).
44 And I think that it is supposed to. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 7, at 144 (“Law is a R
public act. Secret reservations or intentions count for nothing. All that counts is how the
words used in the Constitution would have been understood at the time. The original
understanding is thus manifested in the words used and in secondary materials, such as
debates at the conventions, public discussion, newspaper articles, dictionaries in use at
the time, and the like. Almost no one would deny this; in fact almost everyone would find
it obvious to the point of thinking it fatuous to state the matter—except in the case of the
Constitution.”).
45 JOSE MEDINA, THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF RESISTANCE: GENDER AND RACIAL OPPRES-
SION, EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE, AND RESISTANT IMAGINATIONS 72 (2013).
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discuss its harms and counteract it, both through law and other means.46
Without a concept to appeal to, people who are experiencing some form of
objectionable behavior may find it difficult to convince themselves and
those around them that anything worth addressing has taken place. Even
after the concept of sexual harassment had entered the lexicon, it failed to be
understood as a very serious issue. Others in the workplace attempted to
explain away purported instances of harassment in a number of ways: con-
vincing the complainant she is selfish for bringing negative attention to the
organization, convincing the complainant he must have misunderstood the
event, advancing a “boys will be boys” or a “harmless joke” explanation,
and so on.47 In each of these cases, the explanation for the response need not
(and probably should not) be that the person has ill will toward the com-
plainant. Rather, these responses come out of an inability to fully grasp the
experience of another as a result of underdeveloped conceptual resources.48
In other words, “dominant vocabularies may lack the resources neces-
sary to express the perspectives of subordinated groups.”49 Yet it is this same
dominant vocabulary that makes up our semantic context. Because of this,
we can expect that some of these conceptual gaps will affect how laws are
written and how they are interpreted. We should expect that this will be
especially salient when the laws in question are aimed at, or are presently
applied to, members of oppressed groups. In the following two Parts, I dis-
cuss two ways in which originalism’s failure to account for hermeneutical
injustice in interpretation risks undermining its chief benefit of democratic
legitimacy. First, hermeneutical injustice calls into question the process by
which language develops, suggesting that it is deeply undemocratic. Second,
hermeneutical injustice is likely to result in substantively undemocratic con-
cepts being put to use in laws.
46 An excerpt from Susan Brownmiller’s memoir describes the moment a group of
women coined the term:
The “this” they were going to break the silence about had no name. “Eight of us
were sitting in an office of Human Affairs,” Sauvigne remembers, “brainstorming
about what we were going to write on the posters for our speak-out. We were
referring to it as ‘sexual intimidation,’ ‘sexual coercion,’ ‘sexual exploitation on
the job.’ None of those names seemed quite right. We wanted something that
embraced a whole range of subtle and unsubtle persistent behaviors. Somebody
come up with ‘harassment.’ Sexual harassment! Instantly we agreed. That’s what
it was.”
SUSAN BROWNMILLER, IN OUR TIME: MEMOIR OF A REVOLUTION 281 (1999).
47 See Robin Patric Clair, The Use of Framing Devices to Sequester Organizational
Narratives: Hegemony and Harassment, 60 COMM. MONOGRAPHS 113, 118–20 (1993).
48 An additional concern that is specific to the legal system may be the difficulty of
explaining a wrong done to one in a way that looks like a claim the legal system is
willing to deal with, particularly after Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
(2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), which raised the pleading standard to
require a showing of plausibility. Annaleigh E. Curtis, Epistemic Injustice in Procedural
Gatekeeping: Credibility and Social Justice (Jan. 15, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with author).
49 Jaggar, supra note 10, at 238. R
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B. Exclusionary Process
It follows from the example of hermeneutical injustice that the neces-
sary collectivity of language does not entail that it is democratically created.
To the contrary, language develops parallel to social structures, which have
been unjust. The implications for originalism are serious. Originalism, I have
argued, claims legitimacy from the ideas that the language in a statute or
constitutional provision means something and that this meaning should be
enforced because that language, and not some other string of text, was en-
acted through democratic processes. The words, that is, have the people’s
stamp of approval. However, even if the process for passing laws is demo-
cratically legitimate, I have argued that the language itself is not. The availa-
ble words and concepts do not accurately capture social reality, and this
failure disproportionately affects some groups.50 As a result, we can expect
the words that end up as law to be vulnerable to the same gaps and
exclusions.
The history of legal interpretation tells the story itself. The majority
opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford51 engages in an originalist analysis of the
words “people” and “citizen,” arguing, probably accurately, that the origi-
nal understanding of these words would never have included slaves in those
categories.52
The legislation of the States therefore shows, in a manner not to be
mistaken, the inferior and subject condition of that race at the time
the Constitution was adopted, and long afterwards, throughout the
thirteen States by which that instrument was framed; and it is
hardly consistent with the respect due to these States, to suppose
that they regarded at that time, as fellow-citizens and members of
the sovereignty, a class of beings whom they had thus stigma-
tized . . . . It cannot be supposed that they intended to secure to
them rights, and privileges, and rank, in the new political body
throughout the Union, which every one of them denied within the
limits of its own dominion.53
The conclusion is difficult to escape precisely because the collective under-
standing of citizenship at the time of the founding was unjust and exclusion-
ary. It was, I am suggesting, an act of conceptual domination over Black
people at the time that slaves were not considered eligible for citizenship. If
the linguistic and conceptual landscape at the time of the framing had been
truly democratic, it likely would not have included this carve out in the
concept.
50 MEDINA, supra note 45, at 72. R
51 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
52 Id. at 419.
53 Id. at 416. But see Justice Curtis’s dissent in that case for a different account of the
original meaning. Id. at 569–71.
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Though this example serves just as well to demonstrate the substantive
problem, considered in full in the next Part, it demonstrates the procedural
problem as well. Even if the original understanding of citizenship was such
that the concept contemplated slaves, and even if this resulted in a different
decision in Dred Scott, it should still trouble originalists that the conceptual
resources of the time were not open to all for contribution. Because language
is undemocratic in ways that should trouble us when it comes to legal pro-
tections and entitlements, an uncritical originalism is quite problematic.
For entirely sensible reasons, it is difficult to develop examples in
which the procedural concern comes apart from the substantive concern
cleanly. First, the fact of an undemocratic process in concept generation
means that most important or interesting normative concepts will end up
revealing substantive problems precisely because they are the result of a
process in which the interests of some take precedence over the interests of
others. Second, the extent to which we can look back and apply a critical eye
to the development of our concepts depends on progressive scholarship on
those concepts. That is, it is because of social justice movements, both
within and outside of academia, that we now have the language to discuss
concepts like sexual harassment.54 To the extent that these movements have
focused on some concepts and not others, they have focused, of course, on
concepts that have made a negative difference in the lives of marginalized
people.55
Nevertheless, we can imagine counterfactual scenarios in which the un-
democratic process of meaning-making in a society happens to create con-
cepts that call for, and result in, justice along any number of dimensions.
There might be a benevolent hermeneutic oligarchy in which the power to
generate concepts is held largely by a few extraordinarily perceptive and
empathetic people. If, for example, the view of women’s rights advanced by
54 See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, A Short History of Sexual Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN
SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 1, 8 (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2003).
55 This is true for both practical and theoretical reasons. On the practical side, move-
ments must respond to what hurts on the grounds. On the theoretical side, philosophers
and political theorists have developed and defended the idea of non-ideal theory, which
begins methodologically from the fact of injustice instead of attempting to reason down
from abstract principles of justice:
Nonideal theory begins with a diagnosis of the problems and complaints of our
society and investigates how to overcome these problems. Nonideal theory does
not dispense with ideals but conceives of their function differently from ideal
theory. In ideal theory, ideals function as standards of assessment for any society.
They are not subject to testing in practice because they set standards, outside of
practice, for the success of practice.
In nonideal theory, ideals embody imagined solutions to identified problems in
a society. . . . Circumstances change, and new problems and complaints arise,
requiring the construction of new ideals. If our ideals fail the test, we need to
revise or replace them.
ELIZABETH ANDERSON, THE IMPERATIVE OF INTEGRATION 6 (2010) (footnote omitted).
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John Stuart Mill56 had taken hold in the 1800s, it might be the case that
collective concepts about gender would be significantly better57 even though
the theory arose out of a situation in which women did not have an equal say
in theorizing about gender. In such a society, the fact that the process by
which these concepts were created is undemocratic would not result in the
hermeneutical gaps typical of the actual unjust world. Yet such a society is
still troubling from the perspective of process. The mere fact that a person
who could abuse power does not does not make a system procedurally just.58
“Procedures that purport to bind without affording meaningful rights of par-
ticipation are fundamentally illegitimate.”59
C. Exclusionary Substance
In addition to concerns about the undemocratic process by which lan-
guage develops, the originalist should be troubled by the specter this process
raises: that the substance of our concepts is undemocratic and exclusionary.
If the language that expresses these concepts makes its way into law—as it
almost certainly does—an uncritical originalist reading of that law does not
provide a way of explaining why the language is problematic. One example
of the ways in which hermeneutical injustice affects lawmaking is provided
by Catharine MacKinnon’s analysis of the failures of sex discrimination
law.60
The legal mandate of equal treatment—which is both a systemic
norm and a specific legal doctrine—becomes a matter of treating
likes alike and unlikes unlike; and the sexes are defined as such by
their mutual unlikeness. Put another way, gender is socially con-
structed as difference epistemologically; sex discrimination law
bounds gender equality by difference doctrinally. A built-in ten-
sion exists between this concept of equality, which presupposes
sameness, and this concept of sex, which presupposes difference.61
56 JOHN STUART MILL, THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN 1 (1870) (“The object of this
Essay is to explain . . . [t]hat the principle which regulates the existing social relations
between the two sexes—the legal subordination of one sex to the other—is wrong itself,
and now one of the chief hindrances to human improvement; and that it ought to be
replaced by a principle of perfect equality, admitting no power or privilege on the one
side, nor disability on the other.”).
57 I do not claim that Mill’s view of gendered oppression is actually correct, but it is
at least plausible for the purposes of the example.
58 Indeed, part of the importance of notions of procedural justice is that they help to
explain why outcomes are not the only things that matter.
59 Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 274 (2004).
60 Catharine A. MacKinnon, Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination, in
THEORIZING FEMINISMS 244, 244–45 (Sally Haslanger & Elizabeth Hackett eds., 2006).
61 Id. at 244.
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On its face, sex discrimination seems simple, but how one conceives of sex
discrimination will impact what seem like the correct outcomes in cases,
particularly on the margins.
MacKinnon criticizes the “sameness” and “difference” approaches for
failing to see sexism as a structural issue of power distribution.62 Women
have been unable to theorize fully their own oppression and contribute to a
better concept of sex discrimination in part because of the oppressive social
situation in which they live and its ties to an undemocratic epistemic
situation.
[W]hen you are powerless, you don’t just speak differently. A lot,
you don’t speak. Your speech is not just differently articulated, it is
silenced. . . . You aren’t just deprived of a language with which to
articulate your distinctiveness, although you are; you are deprived
of a life out of which articulation might come. Not being heard is
not just a function of lack of recognition, not just that no one
knows how to listen to you, although it is that; it is also silence of
the deep kind, the silence of being prevented from having anything
to say.63
The inability to articulate a theory of sex discrimination, let alone one that
will be understood and enforced by lawmakers and the courts, is a problem
for women, who face sex discrimination and may have no legal recourse.
But it is also a problem democratically in that law is unable, and sometimes
unwilling, to respond to social experience adequately as a result of the
skewed ways in which our concepts develop.
Another example may help make the stakes clear. Consider the treat-
ment of sexual assault in the Model Penal Code (MPC). Set aside for the
moment that the MPC is not itself a democratically passed statute. The MPC
makes for an interesting case study in statutory interpretation both because it
aims to be a model, so the drafters have, in theory, the luxury to be more
precise than a legislature might, and because it carries with it commentaries
of the drafters providing insight on their thought processes. The intellectual
history of the development of the MPC is quite fascinating.64 There is every
indication that the provisions on rape and related crimes in the MPC were
crafted using what was, at the time, the best information and conceptualiza-
tions of sexual assault available.65
62 See id. at 249–50.
63 Id. at 248.
64 See generally, e.g., Deborah W. Denno, Why the Model Penal Code’s Sexual Of-
fense Provisions Should Be Pulled and Replaced, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 207 (2003)
(providing a history of the sexual offense provisions of the MPC and arguing for reform);
Gerard E. Lynch, Revising the Model Penal Code: Keeping It Real, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM.
L. 219 (2003) (providing a general history of the MPC and arguing for reform).
65 Denno, supra note 64, at 211–13. R
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The problems with the way the MPC deals with sexual assault are well-
documented.66 For example, it was drafted in a time where spousal rape was
not recognized; thus, rape is defined in terms of “[a] male who has sexual
intercourse with a female not his wife.”67 Traditionally rape was a property
offense against a husband or father.68 As rape law developed in the United
States it tended to exclude women of color from its purview while simulta-
neously increasing scrutiny on men of color as potential assailants:
Historically, the dominant conceptualization of rape as quintessen-
tially Black offender/white victim has left Black men subject to
legal and extralegal violence. The use of rape to legitimize efforts
to control and discipline the Black community is well established,
and the casting of all Black men as potential threats to the sanctity
of white womanhood was a familiar construct that antiracists con-
fronted and attempted to dispel over a century ago.69
All of these moves in the law reflected dominant modes of thinking
about racial and sexual politics, with the tragic outcome that rape law served
largely to protect an idealized victim: a virginal white woman attacked by a
man of color whom she does not know.70 “In the nineteenth century, two
major goals in rape jurisprudence arose: to continue to protect white female
chastity when a rape complainant embodied it; otherwise, to protect men
from false accusers.”71 As Professor Crenshaw notes, “[t]he racism and sex-
ism written into the social construction of rape are merely contemporary
manifestations of rape narratives emanating from a historical period when
race and sex hierarchies were more explicitly policed.”72
These narratives inform how we, as a community, think about a whole
slew of interrelated concepts: race, gender, rape, criminality, the role of law,
and so on. And these narratives arose out of deep strains of white supremacy
and patriarchal domination, so the ways they developed predictably failed to
take seriously the experiences and needs of marginalized groups. The treat-
66 CAROL E. TRACY ET AL., RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM,
PRESENTATION TO THE NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES
PANEL ON MEASURING RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATIS-
TICS HOUSEHOLD SURVEYS COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL STATISTICS 5–6 (2012), archived at
http://perma.cc/266Z-TF8T. See generally Denno, supra note 64. R
67 MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1(1) (2001).
68 Michelle J. Anderson, From Chastity Requirement to Sexuality License: Sexual
Consent and a New Rape Shield Law, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 51, 61 n.72, 65 n.41
(2002).
69 Kimberle´ Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and
Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1266 (1991).
70 Karin S. Portlock, Status on Trial: The Racial Ramifications of Admitting Prostitu-
tion Evidence Under State Rape Shield Legislation, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1412–14
(2007); see also Crenshaw, supra note 69, at 1268–69. R
71 Anderson, supra note 68, at 69 (footnote omitted). A friendly amendment to this R
sentence would read: “to protect white men from false accusers.”
72 Crenshaw, supra note 69, at 1268. R
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ment of rape and other sexual offenses in the MPC, then, offers a nice exam-
ple of how well-meaning individuals, working with the best evidence
available to them, will often end up advancing concepts that are substan-
tively unjust simply because they have developed in an environment of
injustice.
IV. CRITICAL THEORY AS A NECESSARY CORRECTIVE
The upshot of the problem of hermeneutical exclusion is not that an
originalist analysis of meaning is impossible.73 Rather, the lesson for
originalists—and indeed all who engage in statutory or constitutional inter-
pretation—is that proper interpretation requires critical theory as a corrective
for historical injustice.74 This is not to say that the use of critical theory is
uncontroversial or easy, but that any interpretive theory that neglects to in-
corporate it is doomed to fail. In this Part, I explain what I mean by critical
theory and argue that it is a natural fit with a sophisticated originalism.
Critical theory is an umbrella term for many different kinds of inquiry
and analysis that share some common features.75 Critical theories must be
“explanatory, practical, and normative.”76 Originalism already aims to be
explanatory and practical: it seeks to explain what the meaning of text is,
and it purports to be action-guiding for the interpreter.77 That is, it tells the
interpreter how to interpret—by reference to the original public meaning—
and it tells the interpreter what to do with that information—enforce a stat-
ute in accord with the original public meaning where this is clear.78 Original-
ists do not typically take themselves to be engaged in a normative task,
however.79 Rather, they are engaged primarily in the descriptive task of in-
terpretation, uncovering a meaning that was already there with no motivation
beyond getting to the best conclusion given the semantic evidence: “Mean-
73 It may always be problematic, but this can fairly be said of any theory of meaning
and interpretation.
74 Of course, this is not the first time critical theory has been proposed as an interven-
tion in constitutional law. See generally, e.g., Mark Tushnet, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A
CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1988) (providing critical analyses of
grand constitutional theories, including originalism); Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Stud-
ies and Constitutional Law: An Essay in Deconstruction, 36 STAN. L. REV. 623 (1984)
(engaging in a critical analysis of Article III). However, these interventions are not typi-
cally made in a way that suggests an originalist analysis is capable of salvation.
75 James Bohman, Critical Theory, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
(2013), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/critical-theory, archived at
http://perma.cc/A787-FEJA.
76 Id.
77 See, e.g., Solum, Semantic, supra note 20, at 2 (laying out four theses of R
originalism).
78 Solum helpfully distinguishes between “Pure Semantic Originalism,” which is the
how-to of originalism, and “Pure Normative Originalism,” which is the so-what of
originalism. Id. at 30.
79 Although Solum does provide a very rich account of originalism’s normative justi-
fications and components. See generally id.
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ings in the semantic sense are facts determined by the evidence. They are not
courses of action adopted on the basis of normative concerns.”80 Yet I have
argued above that originalism’s descriptive focus masks a normative focus,
or is at least not normatively neutral. If it accepts historical and present
power structures as given, natural, or neutral, it reinforces them through
reinforcing their claim on meaning-making.
To say that some field or process is normative is to say that it aims at
something—a goal, an outcome, a value, an end—but it does not say what
that end is or should be. There can be many critical theories, then, which are
quite at odds with each other.81 In the intellectual history of law alone, criti-
cal legal studies, feminist jurisprudence, and critical race theory stand as
towering examples of the diversity of critical theories.
In this Part, I try to advance a relatively minimal critical theory, which
is to say that I will describe the most basic proper aims of a critical theory
for constitutional and statutory interpretation. While I hope that these aims
will be among the least controversial, and that they will appeal to the
broadest possible base, I recognize that universal agreement is unlikely.
However, I will try to pitch these normative aims in such a way as to be
most appealing to current adherents of originalism by showing that they are
likely already committed to the aims of such a critical theory and that these
aims, if made explicit in their process of interpretation, will make for an
originalism that is better both on its own terms and by external assessment.
In particular, I propose that originalism needs a critical theory oriented
toward inclusive democracy. Originalists are already committed to the im-
portance of democracy, so it should be no trouble to admit the value of
attempting to include all voices in the process of meaning-making and sub-
sequent interpretation. To accomplish this, the originalist, who is already
committed to historical inquiry into meaning, must add inquiry into how that
meaning came to be what it is, and whether it results from significant demo-
cratic failures, as in the case of Dred Scott.82
Critical Theory insists . . . on the mediation between theory and
history through the concept of a socially efficacious reason. Ac-
cording to this concept, the historical past has to be understood
precisely as a process of development (Bildungsprozess), whose
80 Id. at 36. I do want to stress at this point in the argument that Solum’s careful
statement is not at odds with the view I advance in this paper. It is perfectly consistent
with the idea that the semantic content of a provision is set by the facts, knowable, ide-
ally, with sufficient evidence. However, when hermeneutical injustice is added to our
account of semantic meaning, we must accept that meaning itself has normative baggage.
Solum seems prepared to accept some version of this already, though other originalists
may be more skeptical. See, e.g., id. at 86–87 (discussing why some originalists attempt
to collapse interpretation and construction together).
81 See Bohman, supra note 75. R
82 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
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pathological distortion . . . can be overcome only by initiating a
process of enlightenment among those affected.83
A judge employing a critical originalist method in the Dred Scott case might
thus review the history of the meaning of “citizen” and “people” in the time
of the framing and conclude that the terms were meant to exclude slaves, but
that these versions of the concepts were produced undemocratically in virtue
of the exclusion of slaves from the creation of meaning.
An example may help to make the method, its application, and its
promise more clear. Others have recently argued that the Thirteenth Amend-
ment holds promise for progressive movements in the search to vindicate
rights.84 These revisitations of the Thirteenth Amendment may provide fer-
tile ground for imagining how a critical originalist would approach a ques-
tion about the meaning of “slavery [or] involuntary servitude.”85 Section 2
of the Amendment gives Congress the power to enforce this ban on slavery
and involuntary servitude through legislation. The Thirteenth Amendment
was, clearly enough, aimed generally at abolishing slavery in the post-Civil
War period, though it was also “seen by many Republicans as securing lib-
erty to all citizens of the United States and allowing Congress to remove
badges and incidents of slavery.”86 The amendment served as the constitu-
tional foundation for the Civil Rights Act of 186687 and to invalidate an
apprenticeship contract made for a Black minor daughter by her mother.88
As Professor Tsesis notes, the Thirteenth Amendment has an advantage
over the Fourteenth Amendment with respect to reducing social injustice in
that it does not have a state action requirement.89 The language of the Thir-
83 Axel Honneth, Critical Theory, in THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO TWENTIETH
CENTURY PHILOSOPHY 784, 784 (2010).
84 See generally, e.g., Jeffrey S. Kerr et al., A Slave by any Other Name is Still a
Slave: The Tilikum Case and Application of the Thirteenth Amendment to Nonhuman
Animals, 19 ANIMAL L. 221 (2013) (arguing that the Thirteenth Amendment should be
read to apply to animals living under conditions of coercion and subjugation); Alexander
Tsesis, Gender Discrimination and the Thirteenth Amendment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1641
(2012) (arguing that the purview of the Thirteenth Amendment should be expanded to
encompass gender).
85 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1; see generally Marcellene E. Hearn, A Thirteenth
Amendment Defense of the Violence Against Women Act, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1097 (1998)
(arguing that the Thirteenth Amendment provides authority for controversial provisions
of the Violence Against Women Act); Andrew Koppelman, Forced Labor: A Thirteenth
Amendment Defense of Abortion, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 480 (1990) (arguing that the Thir-
teenth Amendment provides a convincing basis for the abortion right); Joyce E. McCon-
nell, Beyond Metaphor: Battered Women, Involuntary Servitude and the Thirteenth
Amendment, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 207 (1992) (analyzing the relevance of the Thir-
teenth Amendment’s “involuntary servitude” language to situations of domestic battery).
86 Michael K. Curtis, Resurrecting the Privileges or Immunities Clause and Revising
the Slaughter-House Cases Without Exhuming Lochner: Individual Rights and the Four-
teenth Amendment, 38 B.C. L. REV. 1, 32 (1996).
87 Tsesis, supra note 84, at 1652. R
88 In re Turner, 24 F. Cas. 337, 339–40 (1867).
89 Tsesis, supra note 84, at 1643–44. It also has the virtue, unlike the Fourteenth R
Amendment, of being phrased in gender-neutral terms. See id. at 1643.
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teenth Amendment was enacted, in part, to secure a compromise that would
exclude women’s rights from the ambit of the amendment:
In part, the Senate’s decision not to adopt Sumner’s equality lan-
guage into the Thirteenth Amendment was based on the chauvin-
ism of congressmen like Senator Jacob Howard, . . . [who] flatly
cautioned that including equality would mean that “before the law
a woman would be equal to a man, a woman would be as free as a
man. A wife would be equal to her husband and as free as her
husband before the law.”90
The Thirteenth Amendment provides a good case study for our pur-
poses in that its text in the present seems open to reasonable semantic inter-
pretations that extend beyond remedying race-based injustices.91 The
legislative history, as excerpted above, seems to indicate that the language
was understood by those voting to exclude women from it,92 and an investi-
gation into the public meaning of the terms is likely at best ambiguous.93 An
originalist might be able to make out the case that the original public under-
standing of the Amendment or its operative terms allows for its extension to
gender injustice, but I suspect that it would be difficult. It is certainly the
case that some activists at the time conceived of the status of women as
servitude: “Feminists likened woman’s degraded sociopolitical condition to
the subordinated status of slaves . . . . Neither of them could vote, sue or be
sued, own property, enter into contracts, or choose an employer.”94
A critical originalist, however, has no such difficulty in explaining how
the Thirteenth Amendment could be put to the purpose of remedying gender
injustices. If it is not the case that the original public meaning of the words
in the Thirteenth Amendment contemplated the status of women, then we
must ask why this is so. It seems likely that the understanding of the Amend-
ment was informed by the long history of subordination based on gender and
the centrality of gendered oppression in the general scheme of life. That is,
90 Id. at 1649.
91 See supra note 85. R
92 Tsesis, supra note 84, at 1645–49. R
93 Tsesis discusses the reception of the amendment by the public at the time, and it
understandably has race as its focus:
People around the country understood that by ratifying the Thirteenth Amendment
they were empowering Congress to pass laws against and void all the incidental
violations of civil rights that had been intrinsic to slaves’ lack of freedom. The
framers’ initial purpose in ratifying the Thirteenth Amendment had been to abolish
slavery, but congressional speeches and newspaper articles from the day indicate
that they expected this to only be a first step. The Fourteenth Amendment was
likewise initially passed to address racially motivated injustices. It was only in the
twentieth century that its statements about equal protection and due process be-
came the sources of civil rights protections and substantive freedoms.
Id. at 1651–52 (footnote omitted).
94 Id. at 1662.
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the history of excluding women from public life, denying them material ben-
efits, and the general effect of sexist oppression contributed to the herme-
neutical gap that interpretations of the Thirteenth Amendment suggest:
namely, that there are aspects of women’s oppression that are properly un-
derstood as involuntary servitude.
The practical effect of this interpretative move could be far-reaching.95
For example, Tsesis suggests that Congress could provide a strong “federal
civil remedy for the victims of gender-motivated violence” under the
amendment to replace a similar provision of the Violence Against Women
Act,96 which was struck down in United States v. Morrison.97 “The statute
would create a uniform, national standard to prevent any forced sex or gen-
der-motivated violence that is closely related to one of the incidents of slav-
ery that women suffered.”98 The critical originalist judge may move beyond
the apparent meaning of a text to ask why it means what it means and, if the
answer is that the meaning came about as a result of seriously undemocratic
processes, she may interpret the provision to bring it in line with the goal of
inclusive democracy.
While the prospect of engaging in this sort of critical originalist inquiry
might seem daunting or a backdoor way for judges to impose their views on
others, it is no more so either of these than an uncritical originalism. It is no
more daunting because the originalist must already embark on a difficult
foray into history and linguistics to make difficult decisions. The critical
originalist position simply holds that they must do this with a critical eye
and an aim toward truly inclusive democracy. It is no more a way to intro-
duce particular ideology into decisions because history itself is not neutral.
Where inequalities are pervasive, the less powerful may not
express their wishes even though existing values, practices, and
norms inhibit their ability to live the life they desire. Where there
are people who live according to values, practices, and norms they
are unable to affect, social decision making is not informed, col-
lective, and uncoerced. Where social decision making is not in-
formed, collective, and uncoerced, social criticism plays important
roles in promoting social decision making that is. In contexts of
coercion and disagreement, social criticism is in part responsible
for enabling those who live in the crocodile-infested water to par-
ticipate in social decision making and to influence social change.99
Uncritical originalism accepts as given a language that is “not in-
formed, collective, and uncoerced.” The semantic context of our Constitu-
95 See supra note 84. R
96 Tsesis, supra note 84, at 1692. R
97 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000).
98 Tsesis, supra note 84, at 1692. R
99 BROOKE ACKERLY, POLITICAL THEORY AND FEMINIST SOCIAL CRITICISM 28 (2000).
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tion and other laws has been one of coercion, in need of critical intervention.
Instead of accepting, without argument, meanings imposed on all, a critical
originalist would carefully review the semantic context of a text, and if she
determined that it arose out of a seriously undemocratic situation in a way
that affected the law’s legitimacy, she would note this and proceed from
there.
CONCLUSION
In this Note, I have argued that originalism must address a serious ob-
jection that stems from a persistent feature of the semantic context of any
text. Because our language, like any language, develops in unequal, and
sometimes unjust, ways, an appeal to the meaning of a text and nothing more
will result in reifying those inequalities. The decision to enforce the original
meaning of a text without critical insight is not a neutral decision. Rather, it
will often be tantamount to endorsing an oppressive history masked in com-
mon language. I propose that originalists, if they have any hope of avoiding
this trap, need critical theory. A critical originalist analysis allows the
originalist qua historian not only to unearth the meaning of words, but also
to engage normatively with the process by which a word comes to mean one
thing rather than another.
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